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Research questions
> What different types of of populist communication styles
emerged during the EP election campaign 2014
– and under which conditions are populist communication
styles selected by political parties?
> Is a populist communication style a successful strategy to
attain presence in the print media? 
– and if yes, under what conditions?
> In what way is this populist party communication handled by
the different kinds of print media?
> Germany, Austria, Greece
> 8 weeks prior to the EP elections
> quantitative content analysis of press releases
— all political parties that reached more than 3% in the last national or
European elections (and are running again for EP elections 2014)
— Europ* europ* EU  (2x)
Definition
Populism
> “Populism is conceived of as a political style essentially displaying proximity 
of the people, while at the same time taking an anti-establishment stance 
and stressing the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific 
population segments”
(Jagers & Walgrave 2007: 319)
> 3 components:
— alleged proximity to and 
identification with the population
appeal to the people, homogeneity
— criticism of and distrust in the 
(political) elites 
elite-critique
— ostracism of ‚the others‘
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Types of populism
Jagers & Walgrave (2007)
> All constitutive traits of populism are considered as features of a political 
style rather than being bound to a distinct ideology (Jagers & Walgrave 
2007)
> Populism is conceived as the property of a message rather than the 
property of the actor sending the message (Roodujin et al. 2012).
Thin populism: (1) people reference empty
“Medium 1” populism: (1) people reference and (2) elite critique anti-elitist
“Medium 2” populism: (1) people reference and (3) exclusion excluding
Thick populism: (1) people reference and (2) elite critique and (3) exclusion complete
Theory
Populism and Euroscepticism
> general assumption: Euroscepticism provides a particularly 
favourable environment for populism
> process of (European) integration:
— allocation of competences
— enlargement, membership
> activated issues within Es. discourse:
— democratic deficit of the EU
— distance EU elite – citizens; bureaucracy of EU institutions
— EU accession negotiations, free movement of persons
> Harmsen (2010): Euroscepticism is not a subset of populism
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Theory
The inverted U-curve
Positioning on selected EU Policies, by Left/Right dimension, 
all parties in 1999 (N = 125) 
Source: Hooghe et al. (2002)
Left-right ideologie and EU position in 1999 (EU 15) 
Source: Ray (2007)
Assumption
> H0: Parties settled either on the right or left pole of                 
the traditional political spectrum use more populist
communication styles than mainstream parties.
Results
H0
N = 689; V = 0.17; p < 0.010
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Results
H0
N = 689; V = 0.24; p < 0.001
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Results
H0
N = 212; V = 0.28; p < 0.001
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Results
H0
N = 330; V = 0.37; p < 0.001
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Theory
Forms of Euroscepticism
Eurosceptic Right
po
lit
ic
al
 d
im
en
si
on • rejection of further political integration
➤ driven by the established political class
• criticism is directed to EU politicians
➤ social & political corruption, bureaucracy
cu
ltu
ra
l d
im
en
si
on
• opposition to
➤ (more) immigration
➤ free movement of persons
➤ prospective enlargement to the East
• demand for stricter European          
border controls
(e.g. Betz 1994; Börzel & Risse 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002; 
Kitschelt 1995; Risse-Kappen 1996; Taggart 1998)
Eurosceptic Left
po
lit
ic
al
 d
im
en
si
on
• political critique of the EU‘s                  
democratic deficit
• criticism is directed to political elites
ec
on
om
ic
 d
im
en
si
on
• socio-economic criticism of the                      
EU‘s neo-liberalism
• criticism is directed to economic elites
(e.g .Bartolini 2005; Heine 2010; Hooghe et al. 2002; 
Reungoat 2010; Scharpf 1996, 1999)
Assumptions
> H1a: In the populist communication of left-wing eurosceptic
parties the element of ‚exclusion‘ is neglected and a ‚medium 
1‘ (or ‚thin‘) type of populism is predominant.
> H1b: In the populist communication of right-wing eurosceptic
parties the element of ‚exclusion‘ is overbalanced and they are 
therefore applying a ‚medium 2‘ or a ‚thick‘ type of populism.
Results
H1
N = 264; V = 0.40; p < 0.001
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Results
H1
N = 64; V = 0.55; p < 0.001
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H1
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Results
H1
N = 228; V = 0.43; p < 0.001
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H1
N = 228; V = 0.43; p < 0.001
KK
E
SY
RI
ZA
DI
M
AR
PA
SO
K
ND AN
EL
XA0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
 P
er
ce
nt
Greece thin medium 1 medium 2 & thick
right-wingcenterleft-wing
> transnational nature of the EU
> multi-level governance 
> question of identity
> What identity perception do the 
political parties represent?
> How does this identity 
perception influence        
populist party communication?
nationa
lelites
nation other statesEuropeans
n n-EU 
EU
elites
Theory
Identity
Land (NATIONALITY) only (NATIONALITY) andEuropean
European and
(NATIONALITY) European only Total ‚European‘
AT 33% 55% 8% 2% 65%
DE 27% 59% 10% 2% 71%
EL 49% 47% 3% 1% 51%
Q03: Do you see yourself as...
Source: Standard- Eurobarometer 81 –
European Citizenship – Spring 2014  
exclusive 
national 
identity
inclusive 
European 
identity
right-wing Eurosceptics mainstream parties 
left-wing Eurosceptics:                 
„pro-European communitarian“   
(Heine 2010)
Assumptions
> H2a: Eurosceptic parties from the right address their people 
reference to their own nation.
> H2b: Mainstream parties and Eurosceptic parties from the left rather 
appeal to the citizens of the EU.
Results
H2
N = 264; V = 0.28; p < 0.001
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Results
H2
N = 64; V = 0.27; p < 0.010
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Results
H2
N = 228; V = 0.30; p < 0.010
KK
E
SY
RI
ZA
DI
M
AR
PA
SO
K
ND AN
EL
XA0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
KKE SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL XA
%
 P
er
ce
nt
Greece unspec. national EU
right-wingcenterleft-wing
Conclusion 
> Eurosceptic fringe parties do not use populist communication more often 
than mainstream parties, but there is a tendency to use more medium or 
thick populism than mainstream parties
> Left-wing parties:                                                                                       
anti-elitist populism
> Right-wing parties:                                                                                     
anti-elitist populism & excluding populism
> Parties that represent an inclusive European identity are more often 
appealing to the community of Europeans than to the people of the national 
state 
— (exception I: all Greek parties have a strong national focus)
— (exception II: conservative mainstream parties) 
> Parties that represent an exclusive national identity are more often 
appealing to the people of the national state than to the people of Europe.
Thank you!
